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Abstract  
This study undertook to investigate interest rate pass-through in Zambia with a focus on 
unravelling evidence on the asymmetric response of retail and bond yield rates to monetary 
policy controlled rates. The study utilise a non-linear ARDL model to investigate the 
relationship between policy-controlled rates and retail rates as well as bond yield rates. Based 
on the single-equation error correction model and the associated dynamic multipliers, the study 
is able to model asymmetries in both the long-run relationship and the pattern of dynamic 
adjustment simultaneously and in a coherent manner. In addition, the study present results from 
a symmetrical ARDL model. Results from the study support evidence to the existence of 
asymmetry in the response of retail and bond yield rates to changes in policy-controlled interest 
rates (interbank and 3-month rate). Specifically, there is a negative asymmetry in the response 
of deposit rates to changes in the interbank and 3-month rates while there is a positive 
asymmetry with regard to lending and bond yield rates.  
Keywords: Asymmetry; Symmetry; Interest rate Pass-through; ARDL; Non-linear 
ARDL; Zambia 
JEL Classifications: E00, E43, E51, E52 
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1.0 Introduction  
It is now a well-known fact from a theoretical and empirical perspective that monetary policy 
affects real sector variables of inflation and output through various channels. Chief among 
these channels are the interest rate, exchange rate and the credit channels. A number of studies 
have attempted to study the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Zambia (Chileshe et 
al., 2014; Zgambo and Chileshe, 2014; Mutoti, 2006; and Simatele, 2004). All these studies 
focus on investigating the effects of monetary policy on broad money, inflation and economic 
activity etc. However, the success of monetary policy crucially depends largely on the 
stickiness of retail interest rates (Aziakpono and Wilson, 2013). In particular, for monetary 
policy to be effective changes in the policy rate should be quickly transmitted to retail rates 
and that the magnitude of the change passed on should be large enough to affect aggregate 
demand and consequently economic activity and inflation (Lim, 2001). Literature has shown 
that; if the interest rate pass-through (IRPT) is weak, monetary policy tends to be ineffective 
in affecting real sector variables (Marotta, 2009; Mishra et al., 2013). Therefore, in order to 
make monetary policy more effective it is cardinal to establish the degree of the IRPT and 
thereafter enhance it.  
 
Another important aspect for policy makers and financial sector regulators is to understand the 
nature of the interest rate pass-through, because it is a direct way of assessing the level of 
competition and financial soundness of the banking sector (Aydin, 2007; Hofmann, 2006). In 
particular, policy makers need to check if the IRPT is complete in the short-run and long run 
as well as whether it is symmetric or asymmetric. De Bondt (2005) notes that prices set by 
banks influence their margins, therefore, profitability, and the soundness of the financial system 
and financial stability.      
 
Over the years, a lot of empirical studies have been done across the world exploring the degree 
of stickiness of retail rates and their asymmetry (De Bondt, 2005; Malile, 2013; Aziakpono and 
Wilson, 2013; Sznajderska, 2012; Roelands, 2012; Greenwood Nimmo, Shin and Van Trek, 
2010; and Jamilov and Egert, 2014; Kleimeir and Sander, 2006; Mishra and Montiel, 2012). In 
general, the results from these studies can be summarised as follows: i) there is sluggish and 
incomplete pass-through; ii) IRPT varies across countries and overtime and; iii) the pass-
through is asymmetrical.  
 
Although Zambia has undergone enormous structural change overtime with implications for 
the IRPT very little empirical analysis has been done regarding its nature (Chileshe and 
Zgambo, 2014; Chileshe et al., 2014; Mishra and Montiel, 2012). These studies assume that 
retail rates responds equally to monetary policy loosening and tightening. In addition, these 
studies are not comprehensive in scope as they analyse the response of one retail rate (mostly 
the lending rate) to monetary policy changes. Given the foregoing, the overall objective of this 
study is to comprehensively explore the IRPT in Zambia. Specific objectives include: i) 
investigate the response of various retail and yield rates to monetary policy changes; ii) 
investigate whether the response of retail rates to monetary policy changes is asymmetrical or 
symmetrical, and; iii) to provide policy implications. In this regard, this paper adds to the 
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literature on Zambia by presenting evidence on the asymmetry of the interest rate pass-through 
using relatively longer horizon data. Evidence on the asymmetry of interest rate pass-through 
helps in better understating the transmission process and in better forecasting the response of 
wholesale and retail interest rates under different monetary policy regimes. In addition, 
asymmetry of overarching pass-through (from monetary policy rate to lending and deposit 
rates) might provide some explanations into the pricing behaviour of banks. 
 
This study utilised a non-linear ARDL model developed by Shin, Yu and Greenwood (2009) 
to investigate the relationship between policy-controlled rates and retail rates as well as bond 
yield rates. Based on the single-equation error correction model and the associated dynamic 
multipliers, we are able to model asymmetries in both the long-run relationship and the pattern 
of dynamic adjustment simultaneously and in a coherent manner. In addition, we present results 
from a symmetrical ARDL model. Results from our study support evidence to the existence of 
asymmetry in the response of retail and bond yield rates to changes in policy-controlled interest 
rates (interbank and 3-month rate). Specifically, there is a negative asymmetry in the response 
of deposit rates to changes in the interbank and 3-month rates while there is a positive 
asymmetry with regard to lending and bond yield rates.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical and empirical 
literature; Section 3 provides theoretical framework, methodology and data analysis, which is 
followed by empirical results in section 4 while section 5 concludes and offers some policy 
prescriptions.  
2.0 Review of Literature 
2.1 Theoretical Literature Review 
Literature on the interest rate pass-through has evolved overtime resulting in numerous 
concepts. This literature describes retail rate adjustment, or stickiness, as the responsiveness of 
retail rates to changes in the monetary policy rate. Often analysis of the interest rate pass-
through differentiates between the short and long run (Cottarelli and Kourellis, 1994; 
Aziakpono and Wilson, 2013). In recent years, new theoretical and empirical literature has 
shifted the focus to analysing whether the pass-through is asymmetrical or symmetrical. 
Asymmetry of the interest rate pass-through refers to a situation where market rates responds 
differently to monetary policy tightening or loosening (Cottarelli and Kourellis, 1994; 
Aziakpono and Wilson, 2013; Malile, 2013).  
Theoretical literature offer several explanations for why the IRPT may be sticky, incomplete 
or complete as well as asymmetrical. Among these, include asymmetric information; menu 
costs; switching costs; existence of implicit contracts; ownership structure of the financial 
system; financial frictions; volatile macroeconomic conditions; and bank concentration. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) relate stickiness of IRPT to presence of information asymmetry. They 
argue that borrowers with risky projects tend to accept credit at very high interest rates while 
those with good projects will not (i.e. adverse selection). In addition, increases in lending rates 
tend to induce borrowers to take on risk projects (Moral hazard). It is therefore expected that 
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in the presence of asymmetric information banks may be hesitant to increase rates even when 
the cost of funding is increasing but instead engage in credit rationing. In this regard, retail 
rates may be rigid upwards leading to asymmetry.  
Another explanation for asymmetry is high bank concentration, which results in oligopolistic 
behaviours. The collusive behaviour hypothesis (Hannan and Berger, 1991) shows that deposit 
rates may be rigid upwards because they represent a cost to a bank. Similarly, retail rates on 
assets could be rigid downwards because they could imply lower profits. However, according 
to the adverse customer reaction hypothesis, if customers have bargaining powers then deposit 
rates may be rigid downwards and interest rates may rigid upwards (Neumark and Sharpe, 
1992).  
Regarding interest rate stickiness one explanation is the menu cost theory (Rotemborg and 
Saloner, 1987). This theory predicts that banks will only change retail rates only when the 
benefits from adjustments exceed the costs of doing so (e.g, printing, advertising new rates, 
communication, etc.) In this regard, if banks view monetary policy change to be too small and 
temporary they may decide to delay passing it on to retail rates. 
Further, Egert et al. (2007) and Egert and Macdonald (2009) attributes stickiness of retail rates 
to macroeconomic conditions. They argue that high macroeconomic volatility blurs the 
information content of policy signals making bank to delay their response. They show that 
during episodes of high inflation IRPT is high since prices are adjusted more frequently. 
Further, episodes of high economic growth are associated with high pass-through because it is 
easier for banks to pass-on changes when economic conditions are favourable.  
In addition to the above factors, Grigoli and Mota (2015) relate stickiness to ownership 
structure of the financial system. For example, they argue that state-owned financial institutions 
are often created for achieving policy objectives of government making profit maximisation 
their secondary objective. In this context, state owned banks are less likely to adjust retail rates 
due to political reasons and inefficiencies making stickiness in the IRPT (Cottarelli and 
Kourellis, 1994). Furthermore, foreign owned banks could react slowly to monetary policy 
shocks because their credit policies are not managed locally.   
Finally, Bernanke et al. (1996) shows that existence of financial frictions and asymmetric 
information may cause large fluctuations in economic activity and retail rates. When there is 
information asymmetry, lenders may require borrowers to collateralize their assets. However, 
tight monetary policy deteriorates the value of assets making it difficult for firms to obtain 
credit for investment. This may set off a vicious cycle where tight monetary policy leads to a 
fall in economic activity and hence asset prices, which further tightens financing conditions 
and reduces economic activity even further. This transmission process may induce overpass-
through from monetary policy rate to retail. Another reason, which may cause overpass-
through, is the need for banks to cover the losses through a rise in non-performing loans due to 
tight monetary policy (de Bondt, 2005). De Bondt (2005) argues that in the presence of 
asymmetry of information banks may increase interest rates beyond the rise in the policy rate, 
instead of rationing credit.  
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2.2 Empirical Literature Review 
Empirical literature presented in this paper is categorised in three groups: i) Literature on the 
IRPT on Zambia; ii) Literature on the asymmetry of the IRPT from emerging and developing 
economies, and; iii) Literature on the asymmetry of the IRPT from developed economies.  
Results from Studies on the IRPT in Zambia so far suggest that it is incomplete without 
assessing whether it is asymmetrical or not. Chileshe et al. (2014) using monthly data found 
that the short-run pass-through from the money market rate to the lending rate is 0.02 while in 
the long run it is 0.13. On the other hand, Chileshe and Zgambo (2014) using a similar empirical 
approach but using quarterly data find that the short-run pass-through is 0.21 while in the long 
run it is 0.45. However, the shortcoming of these studies is that they assume that interest rate 
pass-through is asymmetrical which maybe erroneous and likely to produce spurious results. 
Greenwood-Nimmo , Shin and Van Trek (2010) argues that results from a regression model 
which assumes that there is symmetry in the response of interest rates to policy shocks could 
produce misleading results if the true data-generating process is asymmetrical.  
 
Elsewhere, there are a number of studies which have attempted to investigate and found 
evidence of asymmetry of the monetary policy transmission (Greenwood-Nimmo et al., 2010; 
Malile, 2013; Roelands, 2012; Jamilov and Egert, 2014; Kovanen, 2011; Sznajderska, 2012). 
Literature from developed economies (Roelands, 2012; Greenwood-Nimmo et al., 2010) finds 
that there is an asymmetry in the response of interest rates. Specifically, Greenwood-Nimmo, 
et al. (2010) found that in both the short-run and long run pass-through are asymmetrical. A 
hike has a bigger effect on interest rates in the short and long-run while a cut fails to consistently 
affect long-run interest rates in both the short and long run. Roelands (2012) using interest rate 
data on US banks holding companies found evidence in favour of asymmetry. In addition, he 
finds that the pass-through is sluggish as well. Both these studies attribute the response of 
interest rates to bank regulations and the lack of competition in the banking system.  
However, results of studies on emerging and developing economies show mixed results: some 
suggest that results are asymmetrical while others do not. A study by Malile (2013) on Albania, 
using monthly data finds evidence of asymmetry of the interest rate pass-through. Specifically, 
they find that interest rates respond more to monetary policy loosening than to tightening. 
Nevertheless, a more comprehensive study by Jamilov and Egert (2014), using an ARDL 
model, on five Caucasian economies (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Russia) 
found mixed results. Specifically, they find no evidence of asymmetry for Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Russia. However, they find evidence of asymmetry in Georgia and Kazakhstan, especially 
in the long run. Sznajderska (2012) uses the thresh-hold Autoregressive and Momentum-
thresh-hold Autoregressive models to examine the asymmetry of retail rates in Poland. They 
find that Banks adjust interests on credits faster when the ECM term is above the thresh-hold 
due to strong competition and adverse selection. Another finding is that Polish banks are faster 
in adjusting rates for credits to sole proprietors and households when the ECM is below the 
thresh-hold. Finally, they find no conclusive evidence regarding the response of interest rates 
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to negative and positive changes in the money market rate. A study by Grigoli and Mota (2015) 
on the domi 
On Africa, two studies were reviewed with specific purpose of investigating the asymmetry of 
the interest rate pass-through (Kovanen, 2011; Aziakpono and Wilson, 2013). Specifically, 
Kovanen (2011) studies the interest rate pass-through in Ghana using VAR approach, with a 
special attention to asymmetry. They results provide in evidence in support of asymmetry from 
the policy to wholesale rates, which are argued on the basis of lack of policy credibility and 
poor liquidity management. A study by Aziakpono and Wilson (2013) on South Africa uses an 
ARDL model to investigate interest rate pass-through involving six different interest rates. In 
general, they find that the speed of adjustment varies across the interest rates. Lending rates 
have the highest speed of adjustment followed by Treasury bill rate and the money market rate 
while the deposit rate is the most sluggish. More importantly, they find evidence of asymmetry 
of the interest rate pass-through. They attribute the sluggishness of the deposit rate to collusive 
behaviour among banks while they argue that the reason for faster adjustment of lending rates 
is due to high level of competition in the credit market.  
3.0 Theoretical Framework, Methodology and Data Analysis 
3.1 Theoretical and Empirical Framework 
The empirical evidence reviewed in this study clearly showed that monetary policy changes 
may have an impact on retail interest rates both in the short- and long-run. Hence, it is important 
that any empirical strategy developed take into account both of these time horizons. Following 
the empirical literature we assume that the long-run  linear relationship between retail rates and 
monetary policy rate is;   
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 … … … … … … … … 2.1 
Where 𝑟𝑡 is the retail market rate at time t, 𝑖𝑡 is the policy rate at time t, 𝜇𝑡 is the stochastic 
error term while 𝛼 represents the mark up and 𝛽 is the size of the pass-through. In this model, 
if 𝛽 = 1 then we have complete interest rate pass-through otherwise maybe deemed incomplete 
(𝛽 < 1) or overshooting (𝛽 > 1).  
Most often when dealing with time series analysis economists are confronted with the issue of 
non-stationarity which imply that the mean and variance are time dependent. One problem of 
using non-stationary series in ordinary least squares regression is that it may lead to 
meaningless or spurious results (Dougherty, 2006, p.367). To avoid getting spurious results 
economists have to ensure that their models consist of stationary variables. A time series is 
stationary if its moments are independent of time or it is integrated of order zero I(0), otherwise 
it is integrated of order d, I(d) where d is the number of differencing required to make it 
stationary. Empirical literature reviewed shows that interest rates are usually stationary or 
integrated of order one, I(1) (Onunogbo, 2012; Leroy and Lucotte, 2014; Mojon, 2000; Sander 
and Kleimeir,2004; Liu and Tao, 2006). Hence to avoid the problem of spurious correlation we 
can estimate equation 2.1 in first differences; 
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∆𝑟𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛾∆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 … … … … … … … 2.2 
Where 𝛾 is the short run effect of the policy rate on lending rates. Although equation 2.2 
reduces the possibility of spurious correlation it does not incorporate the dynamism that occurs 
among the time series variables in the financial markets as well as the long run effects of 
monetary policy.For example, it does not capture the long-run relationship among the variables 
but captures the short run effects of the policy rate on the interbank rate and retail rates. 
Analysis of the long run requires that the variables are cointegrated so that, even if each series 
is not stationary a combination of them is stationary (Enders, 2010;p.345),(𝜇𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝛼 −
𝛽𝑦𝑡).Hence incorporating this into equation 2.2 results in an error correction model of the form;  
∆𝑟𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛾∆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜕(𝑟𝑡−1 − 𝛼 − 𝛿𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡 … … … … … 2.3 
Where 𝜃 is the error correction term, which captures the rate at which variables adjust to their 
long run equilibrium while 𝜀𝑡 is the error term which is assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed, 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜀). If −1 < 𝜕 < 0 then the variables converges to long-run 
equilibrium and if 0 < 𝜕 < 1 it is said to diverge from equilibrium or that long-run equilibrium 
is unstable. Estimating an error correction model of the form given above requires that variables 
are intergrated of the same order (Favero,2001; Enders, 2010), implying that if variables are 
integrated of different orders then we may produce spurrious results. In this regard, we consider 
an Auto Regressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) model which allows for the existence of 
differently integrated variables in the same regression (Ononugbo, 2012). 
Available literature suggest that there are time dynamics to the pass-through process (Hoffman 
and Mizen, 2004; Ononugbo, 2012; Sander and Kleimeir,2004; Liu and Tao., 2006). These 
findings re-inforces the notion that in time series analysis, independent variables may affect 
the dependent variable with a lag while past values of the dependent variable may have an 
effect on the current variables. In this case, lag effects may exist between policy rate and 
interbank rates on one hand and the interbank rate and the retail rate on the other. Given this 
consideration and after some simple iterations as provided by Shin and Pesaran and Shin (1998) 
, the Auto Regressive distributed Lag, ARDL (p,q) can be specified as follows;  
∆𝑟𝑡 = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
∆𝑟𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ ∅𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0
∆𝑖𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 … … … … … 2.4 
Where 𝜃 is the intercept while 𝛿 provides information about the error correction process. The 
term 𝜔 nests the long run parameter (𝛽), while ∅𝑖 ‘s are the parameters for the short run effects 
of the policy rate on retail rates while 𝜑𝑗 provides the inertial dynamic effects. Hence, ∅0 
provides the contemporaneous effect of the policy rate changes on lending rates. Given the 
error correction parameter and the contemporaneuous parameter, the mean average lag time 
(M.A.L) as derived by Hendry (1995) can be calculated, to provide an indication of the number 
of months required for complete adjustment to equilibrium. The M.A.L is computed as follows; 
𝑀. 𝐴. 𝐿 =
1 − ∅0
−𝛿
… … … … … … .2.5 
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If the policy rates and the market rates are cointegrated the long run pass-through can be 
recovered by; 𝛽 =
𝜔
−𝛿
. As already stated, if 𝛽 = 1 then we have complete pass-through. 
Furthermore, literature has showed that the response of market rates differs depending on the 
type of policy being undertaken by the central bank; tight or loose. This asymmetric response 
to policy shocks could be caused by the fact that prices are rigid downwards and very flexible 
upwards. To analyse the asymmetry response of lending rates to policy rates, as suggested in 
the literature (Greenwood-Nimmo et al., 2010; Ononugbo, 2012) and using an Asymmetry 
ARDL proposed by Shin et al.(2009), the policy rate is split into positive and negative changes 
so that the long-run equation is now written as follows; 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
+𝑖𝑡
+ + 𝛽−𝑖𝑡
− + 𝜇𝑡 … … … … … … … … 2.6 
Where𝑟𝑡 and 𝑖𝑡 maybe integrated of order one, I(1) variables, 𝑖𝑡 is partioned as; 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖0 + 𝑖𝑡
+ + 𝑖𝑡
− … … … … . .2.7 
Where𝑖𝑡
+ and  𝑖𝑡
− constitute the partial sum processes of the positive and negative changes in 
𝑖𝑡 derived as 
𝑖𝑡
+ = ∑ ∆𝑖ℎ
+
𝑡
ℎ=1
= ∑ max (∆𝑖ℎ, 0)
𝑡
ℎ=1
; 𝑖𝑡
− = ∑ ∆𝑖ℎ
−
𝑡
ℎ=1
= ∑ min (∆𝑖ℎ, 0)
𝑡
ℎ=1
… … … 2.8 
𝛽+ and 𝛽− are the assymetric parameters of the long run pass-through. Equation 2.7 can be 
incorporate into equation 2.4 to obtain the assymetric ARDL model; 
 
∆𝑟𝑡 = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜔
+𝑖𝑡−1
+ + 𝜔−𝑖𝑡−1
− + ∑ 𝜑𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
∆𝑟𝑡−𝑗 + ∑(𝜑𝑖
+
𝑞
𝑖=0
∆𝑖𝑡−𝑖
+ + 𝜑𝑖
−∆𝑖𝑡−𝑖
− )
+ 𝜀𝑡 … … … … … 2.9 
There short-run assymetric effects are given by 𝜑𝑖
+ and 𝜑𝑖
− while the long run assymetric 
effects will be recovered from𝛽+ =
𝜔+
−𝛿
 and 𝛽− =
𝜔−
−𝛿
. 
3.2 Set up Tests 
3.2.1 Unit Root Test 
As already mentioned, non-stationarity is a common feature in time series data. Estimating a 
regression with differently integrated series could result in spurious results. Further, it is a 
requirement in ARDL models that variables are I(0) or I(1) because in the presence of I(2) 
computed F tests are invalid (Ouattara, 2004; Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001). In this regard, 
there is need to test for stationarity or non-stationarity in the time series data before proceeding 
to estimation. Three test are employed to test for non-stationarity for robustness check: the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF); the Phillip-Peron (PP); and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
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Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test. Literature suggests that the ADF and PP are similar, but slight 
differences in finite samples (Pelgrin, 2012; Malile, 2013). Both the ADF and PP tests are 
sensitive to structural breaks and therefore the KPSS is added.  
3.2.2 Cointegration Test 
In the presence of non-stationarity in the data set, it has become standard to check for the 
existence of co-integrating relationship among the variables. To test for the existence of co-
integration in the ARDL the PSS bounds testing approach proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) is 
adopted. Assuming an unrestricted intercept, in the PSS bounds approach the test is done under 
the joint null hypothesis of no co-integration as;  
𝐻0: 𝛿 = 𝜔 = 0 … … … … … 2.10 
This test is done using the standard F-test statistic and t-test statistic. However, the assymptotic 
distribution of these are non-standard under the null hypopothesis that there exists no long-run 
relation. Pesaran et al. (2001) develops two sets of assymptotic critical values: one set assumes 
that all the independent variables are I(1); and, the other set assumes that they are I(0). These 
two sets of critical values are then compared with the computed values to determine existence 
of co-integration. If the computed statistic falls outside of the bands then we conclude existence 
of co-integration, otherwise it is not conclusive and requires a re-examination of the stationarity 
of individual variables. 
3.2.3 Parameter restriction Tests  
The methodology outlined above, sets out a methods for assessing two aspects: i) Completeness 
of the pass-through, and; ii) asymmetry of the transmission. To check for interest rate pass-
through completeness as well as asymmetry the Wald Parameter Restriction test (Greene,2012, 
pp 155-161) is employed. As already stated above, the long run interest rate pass-through can 
be recovered from equation 2.4 by; 𝛽 =
𝜔
−𝛿
. Further, if  𝛽 = 1 then there is complete pass-
through. To test the pass through is complete the Wald-test with null hypothesis is utilised;  
𝐻0: 𝛽 = 1 … … … … … 2.11 
In testing for asymmetry of the IRPT the null hypothesis of no asymmetry (𝐻0: 𝛽
+ = 𝛽−) is 
tested against the alternative of asymmetry (𝐻0: 𝛽
+ ≠ 𝛽−) are tested. 
3.2.4 Multiple Breakpoint Test 
An important aspect of time series regression analysis is that relationships among the variables 
may change overtime or a sudden shift in the variables  (Hansen, 1992). Failure to recognise 
structural breaks and nonconstancy in parameter estimates is that it may have severe 
consequences for inferences and forecasting (Glynn, Perera, and Verma, 2007). It is important 
to note that our data covers a period when significant changes in the economy occurred. During 
this period, Zambia undertook various economic and financial reforms under the IMF 
supported structural adjustment program (Whitworth, 2012). In addition, this period covers the 
2007-2010 the global financial crisis which had impact on macroeconomic performance. All 
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these events could have lead to structural breaks which could have changed the long run 
relationships among the variables.  
Given the foregoing, this study utilises the Bai-Peron (1998,2003) procedures to test for 
structural breaks as well as selecting the break dates. Once structural break dates have been 
identified they are included in the ARDL models as additive and multiplicative dummies to 
account for the regime shifts in the long-run relationships. However, only significant additive 
and multiplicative dummies are retained in the estimations unless dropping them lead to 
parameter instability inspected using the CUSUM test and CUSUM squares test. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
3.3.1 Nature and Sources of Data  
To analyse the interest rate pass-through in Zambia, quarterly data is utilised. Specifically, data 
is collected from the Bank of Zambia (BoZ) database for the period Q1 1992 to Q2 2016. All 
the interest rates are available for the entire sample period with an exception of the, the Bank 
of Zambia (BoZ) policy rate which was first introduced in April 2012. However, before this 
period, the policy rate is constructed as the TB-rate plus 200 basis points. In addition, the 2-
year bond yield rate is available from Q1 2000 while 3-year and 5-year bond yield rates are 
available from Q3 2003.  
3.3.2 The Variables 
The analysis consists of 16 different interest rates, mostly of short-term nature. These include 
two savings rates (saving rates for amounts above K100 and less than K100); the seven deposit 
rates on amounts exceeding K20,000(24hr Call rate, 7-day rate, 14-day rate, 30-day rate, 60-
day rate, 90-day rate, 180-day rate);one lending rate (Weighted lending rate); One Check Rate 
for amounts above K500,000; Two official rates (91-day TB rate (or the Policy Rate), interbank 
rate); and three Bond Yield rates (2-Year, 3-Year and the 5-Year bonds). 
Given the aim of  this study, to deduce the reaction of market rates to changes in the monetary 
policy stance by the Bank of Zambia, the monetary policy rates forms the basis of the analysis. 
In this study, two monetary policy rates are utilised; the 3-month TB rate and the interbank 
rate. The use of the interbank rate as a monetary policy variable is two-fold. First, although 
currently the central bank signals the direction of monetary policy stance through the revision 
to BoZ policy rate, it rarely changes on a day to day basis and only forms a basis for monetary 
policy implementation. In the implementation of monetary policy, the central bank monitors 
the interbank rate and intervenes in the money market when the rate breaches the upper or 
lower bound (Mutoti, 2006; Chileshe et al., 2014). Hence, the inter-bank rate is a good indicator 
of the monetary policy stance. Secondly, the choice of the interbank rate is motivated by 
empirical evidence which clearly shows that many researcher have tended to use it as a 
monetary policy variable (Chileshe et al., 2014; Deriantino, 2013). Although the 91-day TB 
rate, the basis for the first part of the interest pass-through is determined by the demand and 
supply of securities. The motivation for using it as one of the monetary policy variables is that 
TBs being short term in nature provides liquidity assets for commercial banks. Hence changes 
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in money market liquidity ocasioned by monetary policy stance will have an impact on TB 
yield rates.   
4.0 Empirical Results  
4.1 Set up Test Results 
Unit Root Tests 
Table 1 presents the results of stationarity tests based on ADF, PP and KPSS tests. The results 
indicate that according to the KPSS test all the series are integrated of order one, I(1). On the 
other hand, the ADF test indicate that all the series are integrated of order one with an exception 
of interbank rate, savings rate, 30-day rate, and the 90-day rate while the PP test also indicate 
that all the series are I(1), except interbank rate and the saving rate for deposits greater than 
K100, 3-month rate and Interbank rate. However, existence of differently integrated series does 
not pose any danger to uncovering the long run pass-through relationship using the ARDL. The 
Pesaran-Schmidt-Shin cointegration test does depend on whether the series involved are I(0) 
or I(1).  
 
Table 1: Stationarity Tests 
 
ADF PP KPSS 
Levels  1st Difference I(d) Levels  1st Difference I(d) Levels  1st Difference I(d) 
Interbank Rate -3.16** -26.94*** I(0) -4.78*** -39.72*** I(0) 1.37*** 0.27 I(1) 
3-month Rate -4.69*** -12.77*** I(0) -3.85** -12.76*** I(0) 0.14* 0.02 I(1) 
Average Lending Rate -1.48 -6.47*** I(1) -1.53 -6.38*** I(1) 0.84*** 0.20 I(1) 
Check Rate -1.93 -7.04*** I(1) -1.83 -7.04*** I(1) 0.21** 0.09 I(1) 
Call Rate -5.94*** -7.61*** I(0) -5.50*** -7.58*** I(0) 0.25*** 0.06 I(1) 
7-Day Deposit Rate -1.74 -14.03**** I(1) -1.88 -14.09*** I(1) 0.24*** 0.04 I(1) 
14-Day Deposit Rate -1.61 -13.79*** I(1) -2.10 -14.14*** I(1) 0.18** 0.04 I(1) 
30-Day Deposit Rate -1.79 -11.98*** I(1) -2.14 -12.99*** I(1) 0.23*** 0.03 I(1) 
60-Day Deposit Rate -3.25** -12.21*** I(0) -2.25 -12.75*** I(1) 0.16** 0.04 I(1) 
90-Day Deposit Rate -3.66** -4.47*** I(0) -2.37 -13.17*** I(1) 0.17** 0.03 I(1) 
Saving Rate<K100 -3.16*** -5.33*** I(0) -2.89** -14.46*** I(0) 0.99*** 0.33 I(1) 
Saving Rate>K100 -3.62** -5.01*** I(0) -2.50 -13.99*** I(1) 1.20*** 0.20 I(1) 
180-Day Deposit Rate -2.36 -11.56*** I(1) -2.28 -11.57*** I(1) 0.14* 0.04 I(1) 
2-Year Bond Rate -2.28 -7.25*** I(1) -1.93 -7.43*** I(1) 0.34*** 0.06 I(1) 
3-Year Bond Rate -0.84 -5.57*** I(1) -1.07 -7.68*** I(1) 0.13* 0.05 I(1) 
5-Year Bond Rate -0.38 -8.20*** I(1) -0.97 -8.32*** I(1) 0.16** 0.07 I(1) 
Source: Computations by the Author. In the table *,**,*** means statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Structural break Test Results 
Table 2 present results of the Bai-Peron tests for structural breaks in the relationship between 
the 3-month TB rate (Policy rate) and other interest rates. Results clearly indicate presence of 
structural breaks. In all cases, both double maximum statistics are significant at 1%, indicating 
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strong evidence in favour of structural change in the link between 3-month TB rate (policy 
rate) and other interest rates. In addition, in all cases the SupF (1/0) is rejected indicating the 
presence of at-least one structural break (see table 3.2 below). Using the sequential methods, a 
structural break is identified in 1998 for 10/15 cases which coincides with Asian financial 
crisis. Further, in all cases a structural break is identified in 2007 coinciding with the start of 
the global financial crisis. Furthermore, in 7/15 cases a structural break is identified for 2004, 
which coincides with Zambia reaching the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative 
completion point. Other breaks are identified to have occurred in 2002, 2010 and 2013. 
Table 2: Bai-Perron (1998, 2003) tests for Multiple Structural Breaks for the Effect of 3-month rate on other rates 
Dependent 𝑈𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑊𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐹(1
/0) 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐹(2
/1) 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐹(3
/2) 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐹(4/3) 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐹(4
/5) 
Break Dates 
Interbank 21.16*** 27.43*** 6.58** 18.92** 6.24 - - 1998Q1; 2010Q1 
Check Rate 36.53*** 57.88*** 65.01*** 18.00** 59.84*** 2.16 - 1998Q4; 2007Q4; 2013Q2 
Call 43.98*** 70.19*** 16.24** 34.61*** 74.45*** 17.41** - 1998Q4; 2004Q2;2007Q4;2013Q2 
7-Day 46.20*** 86.59*** 70.78*** 45.21*** 4.93 - - 1998Q4;2004Q2 
14-Day 34.62*** 63.35*** 16.50** 11.49** - - - 1998Q4;2007Q2 
30-Day 56.60*** 110.92*** 65.70*** 9.11** 34.30*** 32.34*** - 1998Q4;2004Q2;2007Q4;2013Q1 
60-Day 82.00*** 149.57*** 26.53*** 9.49** 23.85*** 9.18** - 1998Q4; 2004Q1;2007Q2;2013Q2 
90-Day 38.09*** 74.68*** 40.28*** 46.73*** 17.82** 6.23 - 1998Q4;2004Q2;2007Q2 
180-Day 47.98*** 94.07*** 27.69*** 13.68** 1.84 - - 2004Q2;2007Q2 
Saving1 38.14*** 71.14*** 34.82*** 27.57*** 18.53** 3.76 - 1998Q4;2002Q2;2007Q4 
Saving2 44.21*** 56.24*** 34.44*** 16.23** 3.29 - - 1998Q4;2004Q4 
2-Year 
Bond 
30.12*** 31.21*** 26.66*** 13.90** 3.90 - - 2004Q4; 2007Q4 
3-Year 
Bond 
111.32*** 218.26*** 32.99*** 7.36 - - - 2007Q4 
5-Year 
Bond 
51.28*** 100.55*** 27.42*** 6.37 - - - 2007Q4 
Source: Computations by the Author using BoZ database 
Table 3 below presents tests results for the presence of structural breaks in the relationship 
money market rate and other rates. Again, results indicate that there are structural breaks in the 
long-run relationship between the money market rate and other rates. In all cases, the double 
maximum statistics are significant at 1% thereby rejecting the null hypothesis of no structural 
breaks. In all cases, the SupF(1/0) is rejected indicating the presence of at-least one structural 
break in the data. Furthermore, in 9/14 cases the SupF(2/1) is rejected indicating the presence 
of two structural breaks while in 4/14 cases the SupF(3/2) is rejected suggesting three structural 
breaks. Finally, in 3/14 cases the SupF(4/3) is rejected indicating that there are four structural 
breaks. Using sequential methods, we identify a structural break in 1998 Q4 coinciding with 
the Asian Financial Crisis; in 2004 Q4 coinciding with Zambia’s agreement for debt relief with 
donors under the HIPC initiative; and in 2007 Q4 coinciding with global financial crisis. The 
identified break dates are included in the ARDL models estimated as additive and 
multiplicative dummies.    
 
 
Table 3: Bai-Perron (1998, 2003) tests for Multiple Structural Breaks for the pass-through of Money Market rate to other rates 
Dependent 𝑈𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑊𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐹(1
/0) 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐹(2
/1) 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐹(3
/2) 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐹(4
/3) 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐹(4
/5) 
Breaks 
Check Rate 69.19*** 121.37*** 13.40** 5.20 - - - 2007Q4 
Call 37.05*** 57.68*** 17.61** 82.84*** 44.79*** 44.73*** - 1998Q4;2004Q4; 2007Q4; 
2013Q2 
7-Day 64.29*** 126.06*** 11.42** 16.39** 4.69 - - 1999Q1; 2004Q4 
14-Day 23.67** 38.93*** 11.93** 16.12** 5.69 - - 1998Q4; 2004Q4 
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30-Day 27.49*** 43.47*** 17.11** 17.01** 10.99** 20.54*** - 1998q4;2004Q4;2007Q4;2013Q3 
60-Day 20.53*** 32.63*** 10.22** 6.29 - - - 2004Q4 
90-Day 30.82*** 48.75*** 19.11*** 9.42** 7.79 27.05*** - 1999Q1;2004Q3;2007Q4 
180-Day 50.14*** 96.48*** 9.48** 3.01 - - - 2004Q4 
Saving1 39.64** 68.50*** 30.88*** 6.24 - - - 1998Q4 
Saving2 26.52*** 59.96*** 11.31** 8.78** 20.66*** 4.86 - 1998Q4;2004Q2;2007Q4 
2-Year 
Bond 
25.11*** 44.17*** 8.85** 11.27** 4.59 - - 2004Q2; 2007Q4 
3-Year 
Bond 
32.56*** 63.84*** 8.72** 3.30 - - - 2007Q4 
5-Year 
Bond 
52.37*** 102.68*** 17.11** 27.50*** 5.95 - - 2007Q1; 2014Q4 
ALR 88.00*** 143.94*** 19.89*** 23.16*** 11.932** 0.932 - 1999Q1; 2004Q3; 2007Q3 
Source: Computations by the Author using BoZ database 
4.2 The Pass-Through Analysis 
4.2.1 Stylised Facts Analysis 
Figure 3.1 below shows trends in retail rates (Deposit Rates, Lending rates) as well as the 
interbank rates and the 3-month TB yield rate. It can be seen from the chart that there is a 
positive relationship between the policy-controlled rates such as interbank and 3-month TB 
rate on one hand and the retail rates on the other, though with a lag. Another observation from 
the chart is that the interbank rate is more volatile from the introduction of the interbank market 
in 1995 to late 2005 compared to the period after 2005. This is expected in that during the 
period of monetary aggregate targeting interest rates are expected to be more volatile as the 
primary aim of the Central Bank is to stabilise money supply in line with its inflation objective.  
Furthermore, the chart reveals that there were wider margins between the average lending and 
deposit rates, which have been narrowing in recent years. This point to the fact that financial 
markets have become more competitive over the years following the reforms of the 1990s, 
causing lending rates to fall quickly. In addition, this reduction in the margins could be 
attributed to the reduction of governments’ borrowing on the domestic money market, which 
has forced the commercial banks to reduce their lending rates to attract private borrowers while 
keeping deposit rates high to attract funds from surplus economic agents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Trends in Interest Rates from January 1995-June 2016 
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Source: Compilations by Author Using 
Finally, in their intermediation role, commercial banks obtain liquidity from three sources for 
onward lending to deficit economic agents at a margin. These sources of liquidity include 
interbank money market, the deposits from clients, and loans from the Central Bank. Hence, 
from a theoretical perspective, it is expected that if financial markets are working well, then 
the policy-controlled rates should lie between the average lending rate and the deposit rates. 
An inspection of the chart shows that for most of the period, the interbank rate and the 3-month 
TB rate were between the lending rate and deposit rates, with an exception of a few periods 
when policy controlled rates were below deposit rates. 
4.2.2 Symmetry Pass-through from the ARDL model 
Tables 4 below reports the estimation results involving the pass-through from the policy rate 
(3-month rate) to fifteen retail rates whereas table 5 provide the results for that from money 
market rate to other retail rates. The results in tables 4 and 5 incorporate additive and 
multiplicative dummies to account for structural breaks. Parameter stability tests are later 
performed using the CUSUM and CUSUM squares test. Results for the CUSUM and CUSUM 
squares tests reported in figures 1A and 2A in the appendix indicate that after incorporating 
dummies the parameter estimates are stable. 
The results in table 4 indicate that the correlation between the 3-month TB rate with the money 
market rate, the retail rates, and the long-term yield rates look relatively weak with the adjusted 
𝑅2 typically between 0.1 and 0.49, with an exception of the 180-day deposit rate which was 
0.59. However, on the other hand the correlation between policy rates and the lending rate as 
well as yield rates was relatively stronger with the adjusted 𝑅2 between 0.60-0.9. Although the 
adjusted 𝑅2 is low in some cases, all the coefficients are correctly signed for both the short and 
long run effects. Specifically, the short and long run coefficients are positive while the error 
correction term is negative. More importantly, the coefficients (𝜔, 𝛿, ∅0) are correctly signed 
and lie in the range from 0 to 1. The results in Table 4 below indicate that all the coefficients 
are statistically significant with an exception of the intercept. In the short-run, a one per cent 
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change in the 3-month TB rate will cause the interbank rate to adjust by close to 66 basis points 
while in the long run the table indicate that there is complete pass-through with mean 
adjustment lag time of just 0.6 quarters or 1.8 months.  
The results for the retail deposit and savings rates which are on the liability side of commercial 
banks show mixed results, with only the 180-day deposit rate having a long-run complete pass-
through effect. For the Check, Call, the saving for amounts less than or above K100, the results 
show an insignificant effect in the immediate short-run. Furthermore, speeds of adjustment 
parameter, though significant in all cases, are very low resulting in high mean adjustment lag 
of between approximately 9.1 to 9.9 quarters or more than 2-years. However, for the retail 
deposit rates with maturity greater than a week have a significant and higher pass-through of 
0.10-0.23 with lower mean adjustment of 2.0 to 8.0 quarters (6 months to 24 months). An 
important observation to note on the deposit rates is that for very short time deposits (less than 
a week) as well as the saving rates the pass-through rates for both the short and long-run are 
lower compared to the long-term deposit rates. This result is expected because very short-term 
deposits are not held purely for saving but transaction purposes while long-term maturity 
deposits are held for saving purposes. Hence, it is expected that long-term deposit rates respond 
more to policy changes than short-term rates. Finally, the Wald test for interest rate pass-
through completeness is significant for the 180-day rate, which is the deposit category with the 
longest maturity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: The Pass-Through of 3-month Rate to Other Interest rates 
17 
 
  
Money 
market 
Rate 
Deposit Rates on Amounts Exceeding K20,000 
Saving rate for Savings 
less or More K100 
Average 
Lending 
Rate 
Interbank 
Rate 
Check Call 7-Day 14-Day 30-Day 60-Day 90-Day 180-Day Saving1 Saving2 
Lending 
Rate 
𝜃 0.039*** -0.058 -0.017 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.007* 0.001 0.038** 0.002 0.007 -0.036 
𝜔 0.407*** 0.022* 0.023** 0.044 0.104*** 0.061** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.359*** 0.013** 0.008 0.270*** 
𝛿 -0.603*** -0.096*** -0.106* -0.130*** -0.255*** -0.114*** -0.267*** -0.220*** -0.420*** -0.104*** -0.104* -0.244*** 
∅0 0.659*** 0.042 0.034 0.152*** 0.100** 0.176*** 0.130** 0.230*** 0.140* 0.006 0.007 0.414*** 
𝛽 0.676*** 0.229** 0.214** 0.338** 0.378** 0.53*** 0.51** 0.615*** 0.856*** 0.123** 0.100** 1.108*** 
𝑅2 0.51 0.34 0.26 0.39 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.49 0.59 0.41 0.40 0.71 
𝜷 = 𝟏 YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES 
PSS Test 9.58*** 5.34** 10.128*** 4.081* 18.34 4.301** 16.36*** 8.763*** 13.18*** 7.33*** 6.649*** 10.57*** 
MAL 0.60 9.9 9.1 8.0 3.55 7.2 3.3 3.4 2.0 9.6 9.6 2.4 
Pass-Through from the 3-Month rate to Long-term Yield Rates 
  2-Year Bond Yield rate   3-Year Bond Yield Rate   5-Year Bond Yield Rate 
𝜃 0.034 0.023* 
0.016 
𝜔 0.481*** 0.401* 
0.225* 
𝛿 -0.474*** -0.483*** 
-0.277*** 
∅0 0.695*** 0.598*** 
0.588*** 
𝛽 1.015*** 0.831*** 
0.812*** 
𝑅2 0.81 0.63 
0.60 
𝜷 = 𝟏 YES YES 
YES 
PSS Test 8.74*** 4.18** 
4.83** 
MAL 0.6 0.8 
1.5 
Source: Computations by the Author. In the table *,**,*** means statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
On the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet, lending rates, and bond rates, results in Table 4 
above show that there is a complete pass-through between the 3-month TB rate to the average 
lending rates and yield rates. Specifically, the coefficients are rightly signed and significant. 
The contemporaneous effect of the policy changes on the average lending and yield rates ranges 
from 0.40 to 0.70, far above those for deposit rates. Furthermore, the Wald test for the pass-
through completeness shows that there is complete pass-through (0.7-1.02). Finally, the speed 
of adjustment parameter though very low and significant in all the cases the speed of mean 
adjustment lag is low and lie between 0.6 to 2.4 quarters (1.8 to 7.2 months). 
Table 1A in the appendix shows the full results which incorporates dummies for structural 
break dates for the pass-through from the policy rate (3-month TB rate) to other rates. The 
results indicate that only the additive and multiplicative dummies for the 1998, 2004, 2007 and 
2013 are significant in the results. Specifically, in 9/15 cases the additive dummy for 2007Q4 
is positively significant while in 5/15 regressions the multiplicative for 2007Q4 are negatively 
significant. In addition, 4/15 cases the additive dummy for 1998Q4 is positive and significant 
while in 2/15 cases it is negatively significant. However, only in one case is the dummy for 
2004 and 2013 significant. These results clearly indicate that the global financial and Asian 
financial crises had significant impact on the IRPT. Specifically, the crises led to a rise in 
interest rates charged by commercial bank on assets and deposits while the transmission of 
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policy changes to yield and retail rates declined. These results are expected in that during a 
financial crisis the probability of default increase making commercial banks charge a higher 
premium on assets. On the liability side depositors tend to ask for funds deposited with 
financial as the see a higher risk of bank failure for which they need to be compensated. Finally, 
the higher level of macroeconomic volatility during a financial crisis reduces the information 
content of policy signals making banks to delay their response and hence making interest rates 
sticky.  
Table 5: The Pass-Through of the Money Market Rate to other interest rates 
  
Deposit Rates on Amounts Exceeding K20,000 
Saving rates for 
Amounts less or more 
than K100 
Average 
lending Rate 
Check Call 7-Day 14-Day 30-Day 60-Day 90-Day 180-Day Saving1 Saving2 Lending Rate 
𝜃 -0.006 -0.023 0.014 0.004*** 0.013 0.013 0.006 0.001 -0.005 0.071** 0.123 
𝜔 0.082** 0.082*** 0.090*** 0.046*** 0.133*** 0.163*** 0.290*** 0.232*** 0.053*** 0.061** 0.049 
𝛿 -0.155*** -0.179*** -0.185*** -0.136*** -0.252*** -0.239*** -0.303 -0.285*** -0.130** -0.178*** -0.053** 
∅0 0.057** 0.041** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.116*** 0.060 0.129**** 0.176** 0.012 0.009 0.152*** 
𝛽 0.527*** 0.458*** 0.486*** 0.336** 0.531*** 0.682*** 0.956*** 0.814*** 0.405*** 0.345** 0.920* 
𝑅2 0.52 0.33 0.39 0.47 0.38 0.43 0.36 0.46 0.34 0.43 0.32 
𝜷 = 𝟏 NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO YES 
PSS Test 7.073*** 20.04*** 16.07*** 22.68 5.691*** 14.045*** 16.645*** 13.824*** 9.865*** 12.884*** 2.150 
MAL 6.1 5.4 5.3 7.2 3.5 3.9 2.9 2.9 7.6 5.6 15.9 
Pass-Through to Long-Term Bond rates 
  
2-Year Bond Yield 
  
3-Year Bond Yield 
  
5-Year Bond Yield 
𝜃 0.020** 0.065** 0.045 
𝜔 0.262* 0.285*** 0.232*** 
𝛿 -0.286*** -0.334*** -0.280*** 
∅0 0.272*** 0.267*** 0.232*** 
𝛽 0.915*** 0.854*** 0.829*** 
𝑅2 0.52 0.29 0.32 
𝜷 = 𝟏 YES YES YES 
PSS Test 5.48** 5.049** 4.540** 
MAL 2.5 2.2 2.7 
Source: Computations by the Author. In the table *,**,*** means statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Regarding the pass-through from the money market to other rates, the results indicate that most 
of the parameter estimates are statistically significant and have correct signs with a few 
exceptions. The long-run pass-through for the deposit retail rates lies between 30-90 basis 
points. An important observation is that very short-term deposit interest rates such as the check, 
call, saving and 7-day have lower short- and long-run pass-through compared to longer 
maturity rates. Specifically, the results show that the contemporaneous effect of the changes in 
the interbank rate on short-term maturity deposit is lie in the range 0.01-0.06 and is significant 
for check rate, call rate, 7-day, and 14-day deposit rates while it is insignificant for the savings 
rate. On the other hand, for deposit interest rates with a maturity 30-days and above, the 
contemporaneous effect is significant for all (0.1-0.2) except for the 60-day rate which is 
insignificant. The long-run pass-through for the shorter deposit rates is incomplete and lies 
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between 0.30-0.55 while that of longer deposit rates is between 0.68-0.9. Furthermore, the 
Wald-test for completeness shows that there is evidence for complete pass-through (𝛽 = 1) 
for deposit rates with maturity above 60-days. Results from the bounds test show that there is 
a significant co-integrating relationship between the interbank rate and all the deposit rates 
while the mean adjustment lag is between 2.9 to 7.6 quarters or 8.7 to 22.8 months.  
On the asset side of the balance sheet, the results show that there is complete pass-through for 
all interest and yield rates. Furthermore, the bounds test also shows that there is a significant 
long-run relationship between the interbank rate and other rates with an exception of the 
average lending rate. Specifically, the contemporaneous effects are significant in all cases 
ranging from 0.15 to 0.28 while the long-run effect lies between 0.82-0.92. In addition, the 
mean adjustment lag ranges between 2.2- 15.9 quarters or 6.6-47.7 months. 
Finally, results incorporating dummies for structural breaks or regime shifts that may have 
occurred overtime are reported in table 2A of the appendix. Results indicate that 10/15 cases 
the additive dummy for 1998Q4 is positive and significant while in 7/15 cases the additive 
dummy for 2007Q4 is positive and significant. Further in 2/15 and 1/15 cases the additive 
dummies for 2004Q4 and 2013Q2 is negative and significant, respectively. Further, the results 
reveal that in 5/15 cases the multiplicative dummy for 1998Q4 is negative while in 1/15 cases 
the multiplicative dummy for 2007Q4 it is negative. These results indicate that the Asian and 
global financial crises had significant impact on the pricing of financial assets in Zambia as 
well as the transmission of money market changes to retail and yield rates.  
4.2.3 Asymmetry Pass-Through from the Non-Linear ARDL Models 
In the previous sub-section, results from the symmetrical ARDL models which assume that 
interest rates respond symmetrically to monetary policy loosening or tightening were 
presented. However, a lot of empirical literature has revealed that economic agents respond 
differently to either loosening or tightening (Ononugbo, 2012; Greenwood-Nimmo et al., 
2010). These papers have gone on to argue that results obtained from symmetrical ARDL 
models could actually present spurious outcomes. In this section, results from the Non-Linear 
ARDL (NARDL) models presented. In particular, we present results for both the asymmetrical 
IRPT from the Policy rate to the money market rate and other rates as well as from the money 
market rate to the retail rates and yield rates.  
The summary of the results for the NARDL model of the 3-month interest rate to other interest 
rates are presented in Table 6 below. Results on the IRPT from the 3-month TB rate to other 
rates show that all the important parameters are significant and correctly signed with an 
exception of the intercept terms and some contemporaneous effects. In the case of the effect of 
the 3-month TB rate on the interbank rate, the results show that there is complete pass-through 
though it is asymmetrical for both short and long run. Further, the results show that there is a 
quicker response of the interbank rate to the 3-month changes with the mean adjustment lag of 
0.6 quarters (1.8 months) for positive changes and 1.1 quarter or 3.3 months for negative 
changes.  In the case of deposit rates, all with the exception of the 90-day (for both short and 
long run) and the saving rate for amounts less than K100 (for long run) show asymmetrical 
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behaviour, a negative asymmetry. Specifically, the results show that both the contemporaneous 
and long run response deposit interest rates respond less to a fall in the 3-month rate compared 
to a rise. Finally, the PSS tests confirm the existence of long-run relationship for all except for 
the 60-day rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: The asymmetric Pass-through of the 3-month rate to other rates 
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Money 
market 
Rate 
Deposit Rates on Amounts Exceeding K20,000 
Saving rates for Amounts 
less or more K100 
Average 
Lending 
Rate 
Interbank 
Rate 
Check Call 7-Day 14-Day 30-Day 60-Day 90-Day 180-Day Saving1 Saving2 
Lending 
Rate 
𝜃 
0.022 0.016** 0.050*** 0.043 0.041 0.036 0.002 0.048 0.064* 0.083 0.069*** 0.034*** 
𝜔− 0.309** 0.057* 0.016 0.059* 0.058** 0.103* 0.101** 0.080** 0.370*** 0.013* 0.017 0.104** 
𝜔+ 
0.348** 0.040 0.025 0.041 0.042 0.097* 0.093** 0.079* 0.410*** 0.013 0.028* 0.161*** 
𝛿 
-0.402*** -0.134*** -0.144*** -0.111** (0.113)** (0.136)** (0.117)*** (0.130)*** (0.454)*** (0.084)*** (0.213)*** (0.151)*** 
∅0
− 
0.565*** 0.026* 0.062** 0.251*** 0.231* 0.146* 0.185** 0.095* 0.140** 0.077 0.022** 0.157*** 
∅0
+ 
0.772** -0.025 0.051 0.110* 0.120 0.098** 0.044*** 0.255*** 0.178* 0.012 0.012 0.489*** 
𝛽− 
0.767*** 0.423** 0.174* 0.535*** 0.514** 0.760*** 0.793* 0.619** 0.815*** 0.151** 0.339* 0.691** 
𝛽+ 
0.865** 0.299 0.111 0.372*** 0.370 0.718** 0.866** 0.606** 0.903*** 0.151* 0.213* 1.109*** 
𝑅2 
0.44 0.39 0.62 0.44 0.57 0.58 0.45 0.64 0.53 0.34 0.31 0.74 
𝛽− = 1 
YES NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO NO YES 
𝛽+ = 1 
YES NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO NO YES 
𝛽+ = 𝛽− 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES NO NO 
∅0
+ = ∅0
− 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO 
PSS Test 
6.230*** 7.324*** 10.797*** 4.386** 6.909*** 3.398* 2.556 3.430* 10.770*** 3.371* 10.471*** 7.350*** 
MAL- 
0.6 7.3 6.5 6.7 6.6 6.3 7.0 5.7 1.9 11.0 12.0 5.6 
MAL+ 
1.1 7.7 6.6 8.0 7.8 6.6 8.2 6.9 1.8 12.1 12.1 3.4 
Pass-through from the 3-month rate to long term Yield rates 
  
2-Year Bond Yield rate 
 
3-Year Bond Yield Rate 
 
5-Year Bond Yield Rate 
𝜃 
0.019* 0.028** 0.038 
𝜔− 0.434*** 0.596*** 0.303** 
𝜔+ 0.459*** 0.750*** 0.460*** 
𝛿 
(0.432)*** (0.743)*** -0.399*** 
∅0
− 
0.482** 0.425** 0.548*** 
∅0
+ 
0.757*** 0.725* 0.564*** 
𝛽− 
1.006*** 0.802*** 0.759** 
𝛽+ 
1.064** 1.009*** 1.153** 
𝑅2 
0.77 0.67 0.73 
𝛽− = 1 
YES YES YES 
𝛽+ = 1 
YES YES YES 
𝛽+ = 𝛽− 
NO NO NO 
∅0
+ = ∅0
− 
NO NO NO 
PSS Test 
3.791* 5.959*** 3.901** 
MAL- 
1.2 0.8 1.2 
MAL+ 
0.6 0.4 1.1 
Source: Computations by the Author. In the table *,**,*** means statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
In the case of the retail lending rate and yield rates, the results show that there is positive 
asymmetry as well as a complete pass-through for both upward and downward adjustments in 
the policy rate.  Specifically, a 1% rise in the 3-month rate will contemporaneously (or in the 
short-run) cause a significant of 0.489% rise in the lending rate and a significant 0.157% for a 
drop while in the long-run it will rise by 1.11% and drop of 0.69%, respectively. In the case of 
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the yield rates on securities, the contemporaneous effect is between 0.56-0.76% for positive 
changes and 0.42-0.54% for negative changes while in the long run it is 1.0-1.2% for positive 
changes and 0.76-1.01% for negative changes. The Wald test for symmetry shows that there is 
asymmetry in the response of the deposit rates while the PSS-test shows the existence of the 
long-run relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: The asymmetric Pass-through of the money market rate to other rates 
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Deposit Rates on Amounts Exceeding K20,000 Saving rates 
Average 
lending 
Rate 
Check Call 7-Day 14-Day 30-Day 60-Day 90-Day 180-Day Saving1 Saving2 Lending 
Rate 
𝜃 
0.029*** -0.005 0.098* 0.160** 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.171*** 0.021** 0.100*** 0.075*** 
𝜔− 0.037 0.030 0.069*** 0.091*** 0.042*** 0.163*** 0.172*** 0.163*** 0.056** 0.041 0.071*** 
𝜔+ 0.029 0.019 0.048*** 0.081*** 0.041*** 0.150*** 0.156*** 0.162*** 0.055** 0.026 0.065* 
𝛿 
(0.168)*** (0.124)* (0.194)*** (0.210)*** (0.065)*** (0.248)*** (0.213)*** (0.215)*** (0.136)*** (0.132)*** (0.144)*** 
∅0
− 
0.018 0.089*** 0.112** 0.080 0.103* 0.103** 0.125** 0.160* 0.076** -0.018 0.140** 
∅0
+ 
0.005 0.013 0.058* -0.014 0.089* 0.008 0.062 0.114*** -0.068 0.000 0.161* 
𝛽− 
0.222 0.245* 0.357*** 0.436** 0.647*** 0.658*** 0.805*** 0.759*** 0.414*** 0.312* 0.449*** 
𝛽+ 
0.174 0.115** 0.249** 0.384** 0.545*** 0.603** 0.731*** 0.757*** 0.407*** 0.200** 0.492*** 
𝑅2 
0.48 0.32 0.35 0.44 0.49 0.42 0.41 0.48 0.40 0.4 0.45 
𝜷− = 𝟏 
NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO 
𝜷+ = 𝟏 
NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO 
𝜷+ = 𝜷− 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
∅𝟎
+ = ∅𝟎
− 
NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
PSS Test 
13.649*** 9.287*** 10.095*** 9.842*** 4.217** 9.878*** 9.586*** 8.880*** 4.966** 4.321** 4.983** 
MAL- 
5.8 7.4 4.5 4.4 4.9 3.6 4.1 3.9 6.8 7.6 6.0 
MAL+ 
5.9 8.0 4.9 4.8 4.0 4.0 4.4 4.4 7.8 7.7 5.8 
Pass-through from the money market rate to long term Yield rates 
  2-Year Bond Yield    3-Year Bond Yield    5-Year Bond Yield  
𝜃 
0.193*** 0.052 0.008 
𝜔− 
0.107*** 0.246*** 0.188** 
𝜔+ 0.139*** 0.271*** 0.225*** 
𝛿 
(0.187)*** (0.421)*** (0.292)*** 
∅0
− 
0.137* 0.136*** 0.183** 
∅0
+ 
0.171** 0.214*** 0.245* 
𝛽− 
0.570*** 0.585*** 0.610*** 
𝛽+ 
0.744*** 0.642*** 0.773*** 
𝑅2 
0.56 0.30 0.32 
𝜷− = 𝟏 
NO NO NO 
𝜷+ = 𝟏 
YES NO YES 
𝜷+ = 𝜷− 
NO NO NO 
∅𝟎
+ = ∅𝟎
− 
NO NO NO 
PSS Test 
6.347*** 3.883** 4.048** 
MAL- 
4.4 2.1 2.6 
MAL+ 
4.6 1.8 2.8 
Source: Computations by the Author. In the table *,**,*** means statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
The results of NARDL model for the pass-through from money market to retail and securities 
yield rates are presented in Table 7 above. Results in table 7 include additive and multiplicative 
dummies for the identified structural breaks in the data. Generally, the results from the models 
show low levels of explanatory power with adjusted 𝑅2 of between 0.30-0.49. The results show 
that positive changes in the interbank rate have limited contemporaneous effect on deposit rates 
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while negative changes have significant immediate impact. In-fact, negative changes have a 
significant effect on all deposit rates with an exception of the check rate, 14-day and the saving 
rate for amounts above K100. On the other hand, positive changes have mostly insignificant 
effects with an exception of 7-day, 30-day and 180-day rate. However, in the long run both 
positive and negative changes in the interbank have significant effect on the deposit rates with 
an exception of the check rate. Specifically, the results show that a 1% positive change in the 
interbank rate will cause deposit rates to rise by between 0.17-0.76% while a negative change 
would cause interest rates to fall by between 0.12-0.81% in the long-run. In addition, the Wald-
test for symmetry shows that with a few exceptions there is asymmetry of the pass-through 
between positive and negative changes in the long run. The long-run exceptions include 90-
day and 180-day while for the contemporaneous effects it is the saving rate for amounts less 
than K100 and the 14-day deposit rate. Finally, the Bounds test results show that there is a 
significant long-run relationship in all cases.  
On the asset side, the results from Table 7 above show that there is relatively better explanatory 
power is relatively low with an exception of the 2-year bond yield rate with the adjusted r-
squared of 0.56. The results show that there is asymmetry of the pass-through both in the short- 
and long-run. Specifically, the effects of positive changes in the interbank rate on lending and 
yield rates lie between 0.16-0.25% while for negative changes it is between 0.13-0.19 in the 
short-run while in the long run it is between 0.49-0.800 for positive changes and 0.45-0.61% 
for negative changes. Furthermore, the Wald-test for long-run asymmetry completeness shows 
that there is only complete pass-through for positive change in the 2-year yield rate and 5-year 
bond yield rate while for negative changes there is none, which shows complete pass-through.  
5.0 Conclusions and Discussions 
This paper investigates interest rate pass-through of monetary policy changes to retail and yield 
rates in Zambia. Specifically, the study focuses on unravelling evidence on the asymmetric 
response of retail and bond yield rates to monetary policy. The empirical analysis is undertaken 
in two phases, namely; the first parts looks at the symmetrical response of retail and bond yield 
rates to changes in policy controlled rates while the second part looks at the asymmetrical 
response of retail and bond yield rates.    
Using quarterly data and results of the linear ARDL model: i) there is low pass-through from 
the 3-month rate or Policy rate to the deposit rates while there is a high and complete pass-
through to the lending and yield rates. This result is consistent with findings by others 
(Ononugbo, 2012; Hoffman and Mizen, 2004; de Bondt, 2005). This result has many 
implications regarding the behaviour of commercial banks. Specifically, they imply that 
commercial banks do not raise or reduce deposit rates quickly in response to monetary policy 
loosening or tightening in order to increase their profit margins or cut costs. On the other hand, 
commercial banks raise or cut their interest rates on the assets to protect their margins. This 
also gives an impetus for us to look at the asymmetry of interest rates response; ii) There is a 
strong pass-through from the policy rate (3-month rate) to the money market rate in the short- 
and long-run. This result clearly shows that monetary policy has a strong effect on the money 
market which is the first stage in monetary policy transmission; iii) There is generally short-
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term stickiness of the interest rates relative to long-run. This result is consistent with others 
(Ononugbo, 2012; Mojon, 2000; De Bondt, 2005; Chileshe and Zgambo, 2014). It is important 
to note that monetary policy would be effective if the contemporaneous effect were larger. 
Although, the immediate pass-through is higher in some instances such as policy to interbank 
rate, it is generally lower than unit. This clearly indicates that interest rates are sluggish in the 
short run. iv); and Finally, the pass-through from the money market rate are generally higher 
and complete for longer maturity deposit rates and asset side rates. The results show that the 
pass-through from the money market rate to retail rates is higher for deposits with maturity of 
30-days and above as well as for the lending and yield rates. However, the pass-through is 
generally lower for the deposit rates with maturities less than a month.  
On the other conclusions drawn from results using the NARDL model include: i) the pass-
through is generally higher from the 3-month rate (policy rate) than from the interbank rate. 
In general, the pass-through from the interbank rate is slower and lower compared to that from 
policy rate for both positive and negative changes. This result is similar to those obtained by 
Ononugbo (2012) on Nigeria. This could be explained in the sense that economic agents 
consider changes in the policy rate more cardinal in interpreting future changes in economic 
fundamentals than changes in money market rate, which could be responding to changes in 
financial market liquidity, which could be attributed to other factors other than policy changes.  
i) There is negative asymmetry in the pass-through from policy to deposit rates. The 
results show that commercial bank tend to cut interest rates on deposit more during 
loosening compared to periods of tightening. Specifically, commercial banks 
reduce interest rates less in response to loosening compared to the increase in 
response to tightening in both the short- and long-run. This may arise when 
commercial banks are biased towards maintaining or increasing their margins. This 
is highly likely in markets where there are high levels of concentration or less 
competition in the banking sector where the source of funds is not primarily 
deposits.  
ii) There is a positive asymmetry in the pass-through from both interbank rate and 
policy rates to lending and yield rates. The yield rates and lending rate showed a 
positive asymmetry both in the short and long run, which shows that commercial 
banks tend to increase interest rates when there is tightening while they are not 
willing to lower these rates when there is policy loosening.  
In general, results from the analysis point to evidence of asymmetry in the response of interest 
rates to changes in policy-controlled rates to retail and yield rates. This phenomenon may arise 
for a number of reasons such as: 1) the bank-borrower relationship maybe characterised by 
higher switching costs or incomplete information on the part of bank client (Greenwood-
Nimmo et al., 2010). For example, when the cost of funds increases due to tight policy 
commercial banks increases interest rates to maintain their margins while when the interest rate 
fall banks cut the rates less. Further, switching costs and information costs maybe more relevant 
in case of consumer loans such as business and household loans (Borio and Fritz, 1995; Mojon, 
2000); 2) Retail rates maybe rigid due to market structure in the banking system (Greenwood-
Nimmo et al., 2010). If the markets are oligopolistic the lending maybe rigid downwards as 
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banks may be scared of cutting prices for fear of starting a price war; 3) Positive asymmetry 
may arise due to demand-side phenomenon, linked to business cycles. During a recession the 
demand for loans may become more inelastic as more firms become bank dependent making 
them vulnerable to the banks. 
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Appendix A 
Figure 1A:  CUSUM plots for the pass-through of the changes in 3-month rate to other rates incorporating structural breaks 
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Figure 2A: CUSUM Plots of the Pass-through of changes in the Money Market Rate to others Rates after taking account Structural Breaks 
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Table 1A: ARDL results of the pass-through of changes in the 3-month Rate to other Interest Rates incorporating Break Dates 
∆𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 0.659∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 − 0.146∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 + 0.054𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 + 0.039 − 0.407𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 0.603𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                                               ( 0.000)             (0.356)                      (0.016)             (0.299)    (0.000)             ( 0.000)                                            R2=0.51 
∆𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑡 = 0.250∆𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑡−1 + 0.151∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.063𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 − 0.203𝐵𝑜𝑍𝑅 ∗ 𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 − 0.058 − 0.096𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑡−1 + 0.022𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                        ( 0.049)                     (0.019)               (0.023)                 (0.000)                            (0.156)    (0.000)                   (0.049)                  R2=0.34   
∆𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡 = 0.285∆𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡−3 + 0.034∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.018𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 − 0.017 − 0.106𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡−1 + 0.023𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                                             ( 0.000)                      (0.257)              (0.187)             (0.251)     (0.049)               (0.052)                                           R2=0.26 
∆7𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 = 0.152∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 − 0.016𝐵𝑜𝑍𝑟 ∗ 𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 + 0.002 − 0.130 ∗ 7𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.044𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                                                             ( 0.001)       (0.067)                             (0.183)   (0.002)                     (0.103)                                                R2=0.39 
∆14𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 = 0.137∆14𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.152∆14𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−2 + 0.187∆14𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−3 + 0.100∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.001𝑆𝐷0704 − 0.0004 − 0.255 ∗ 14𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.104𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                         (0.155)                     (0.055)                     (0.000)                     (0.029)               (0.075)               (0.313)    (0.000)                       (0.000)        R2=0.34 
∆30𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 = 0.214∆30𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.176∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.079𝑆𝐷9804 − 0.052𝐵𝑂𝑍𝑟 ∗ 𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 + 0.0004 − 0.114 ∗ 30𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.061𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                              (0.025)                     (0.000)              (0.000)           (0.000)                            (0.886)      (0.0017)                    (0.026)               R2=0.38 
∆60𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 = 0.180∆60𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.130∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.011𝑆𝐷0704 + 0.002𝑆𝐷13𝑄2 + 0.007 − 0.267 ∗ 60𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.136𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                               (0.067)                     (0.014)                (0.024)             (0.084)                 (0.089)   (0.000)                    (0.000)                         R2=0.40 
∆90𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 = 0.396∆90𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.230∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.008𝑆𝐷0704 − 0.045𝐵𝑜𝑍𝑟 ∗ 𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 + 0.001 − 0.220 ∗ 90𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.136𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                             (0.000)                       (0.003)               (0.057)          (0.001)                           (0.101)     (0.008)                      (0.000)               R2=0.49 
∆180𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 = 0.183∆180𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.140∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 − 0.052𝐷04𝑄4 + 0.038 − 0.359 ∗ 180𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.420𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                                             (0.050)                       (0.043)               (0.001)             (0.014)     (0.000)                        (0.000)                                R2=0.59 
∆𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑡 = 0.228∆𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑡−1 + 0.006∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.004𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 − 0.037𝐵𝑜𝑍𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 + 0.001 − 0.104 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑡−1 + 0.013𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                      (0.026)                        (0.185)               (0.058)                  (0.078)                                            (0.000)                         (0.047)         R2=0.41 
∆𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔2𝑡 = 0.215∆𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑡−1 + 0.007∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 − 0.038𝐵𝑜𝑍𝑟 ∗ 𝑆𝐷0704 + 0.007 − 0.104 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑡−1 + 0.008𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                                     (0.024)                        (0.301)                (0.041)                            (0.135)   (0.068)                         (0.001)                        R2=0.40 
∆𝐴𝐿𝑅𝑡 = 0.310∆𝐴𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 + 0.414∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.048𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 − 0.114𝐵𝑜𝑍𝑅 ∗ 𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 −  0.036 + 0.270 ∗ 90𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.244𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                               (0.021)                  (0.000)             (0.004)            (0.005)                      (0.096)     (0.000)                      (0.000)                      R2=0.71 
∆𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑2_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 = 0.173∆𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑2_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 0.695∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.034 + 0.015𝑆𝐷0704 − 0.474 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑2_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 0.481𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                                        (0.029)                                 (0.000)             (0.109)    (0.015)             (0.000)                                (0.000)                      R2=0.81                                          
∆𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑3_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 = 0.588∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.016 + 0.011𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 − 0.277 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑3_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 0.277𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                                                               (0.000)            (0.141)    (0.057)                 (0.090)                               (0.009)                                          R2=0.60                                         
∆𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑5_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 = 0.598∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.023 + 0.014𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 − 0.483 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑5_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 0.401𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                                                               (0.000)            (0.121)    (0.053)                 (0.018)                               (0.007)                                          R2=0.63                                       
Source: Computations by the Author 
 
Table 2A: ARDL results of the Money Market Rate Pass-through to other Interest Rates incorporating Break Dates 
∆𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑡 = 0.462∆𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑡−1 + 0.057∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 0.011𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 − 0.114𝐼𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 − 0.006 − 0.155𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑡−1 + 0.082𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 
                                        ( 0.000)                     (0.048)               (0.013)                 (0.031)                            (0.311)    (0.000)                   (0.021)                  R2=0.52   
∆𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡 = −0.091∆𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡−1 + 0.041∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 0.021𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 + 0.001𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 − 0.007𝑆𝐷13𝑄4 − 0.023 − 0.179𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡−1 + 0.082𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                    ( 0.148)                  (0.024)             (0.087)                 (0.063)                  (0.073)             (0.202)    (0.002)               (0.000)               R2=0.33 
∆7𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 = 0.025∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 0.048𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 − 0.017𝐼𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 + 0.009𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 + 0.014 − 0.185 ∗ 7𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.090𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 
                                          ( 0.000)               (0.001)               (0.003)                             (0.069)                (0.169)    (0.000)                     (0.000)                   R2=0.39 
∆14𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 = 0.027∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 0.085𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 − 0.026𝐼𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 + 0.004 − 0.136 ∗ 14𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.046𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                                        ( 0.000)               (0.000)               (0.000)                             (0.000)    (0.000)                     (0.000)                                 R2=0.47 
∆30𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 = 0.351∆30𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.116∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 0.036𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 − 0.170𝐼𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 + 0.013 − 0.252 ∗ 14𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.133𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 
                                       ( 0.002)                  (0.000)               (0.032)                (0.000)                             (0.157)    (0.000)                      (0.000)                 R2=0.38 
∆60𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 = 0.293∆30𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.060∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 − 0.036𝑆𝐷04𝑄4 + 0.013 − 0.239 ∗ 14𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.163𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 
                                                           ( 0.003)                    (0.116)                  (0.013)              (0.256)   (0.000)                      (0.000)                                    R2=0.43 
∆90𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 = 0.418∆90𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.126∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 0.043𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 − 0.190𝐼𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 + 0.006 − 0.303 ∗ 90𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.290𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 
                                           ( 0.001)                    (0.000)            (0.006)                 (0.000)                          (0.743)    (0.000)                      (0.000)                 R2=0.36 
∆180𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 = 0.313∆180𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.176∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 0.015𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 − 0.110𝐼𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 + 0.001 − 0.285 ∗ 90𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.232𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 
                                           ( 0.004)                      (0.079)              (0.016)                 (0.053)                        (0.693)    (0.000)                      (0.000)              R2=0.36 
∆𝑆𝑉𝑅1𝑡 = 0.287∆𝑆𝑉𝑅1𝑡−1 + 0.012∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 0.003𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 − 0.005 − 0.130 ∗ 𝑆𝑉𝑅1𝑡−1 + 0.053𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 
                                                           ( 0.027)                     (0.563)               (0.070)              (0.670)    (0.015)                      (0.007)                                     R2=0.35 
∆𝑆𝑉𝑅2𝑡 = 0.520∆𝑆𝑉𝑅2𝑡−1 + 0.008∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 0.009𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 + 0.071 − 0.178 ∗ 𝑆𝑉𝑅2𝑡−1 + 0.061𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 
                                                              ( 0.002)                    (0.715)             (0.032)              (0.032)    (0.000)                      (0.013)                                     R2=0.43 
∆𝐴𝑙𝑟𝑡 = 0.523∆𝐴𝑙𝑟𝑡−1 + 0.154∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 0.049𝑆𝐷98𝑄4 − 0.014𝑆𝐷04𝑄4 + 0.123 − 0.053 ∗ 7𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 0.049𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 
                                                 ( 0.000)               (0.000)            (0.011)                (0.043)                (0.169)    (0.042)                     (0.096)                           R2=0.32 
∆𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑2_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 = 0.490∆𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑2_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 0.272∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.020 + 0.010𝑆𝐷0704 − 0.016𝑆𝐷0404 − 0.286 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 0.262𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                            (0.000)                                (0.000)               (0.049)    (0.058)                 (0.045)             (0.013)                            (0.068)         R2=0.81                                          
∆𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑3_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 = 0.267∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.065 + 0.010𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 − 0.334 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑3_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 0.285𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                                                            (0.000)               (0.039)    (0.017)               (0.002)                                 (0.001)                                          R2=0.29 
∆𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑5_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 = 0.232∆𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡 + 0.045 + 0.044𝑆𝐷07𝑄4 − 0.280 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑3_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 0.232𝐵𝑜𝑧𝑟𝑡−1 
                                                                            (0.004)               (0.164)   (0.082)               (0.006)                                 (0.005)                                          R2=0.32 
Source: Computations by the Author 
 
